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Abstract
We investigate both the rational explosive inﬂation paths studied
by (McCallum 2001), and the classiﬁcation of ﬁscal and monetary
policies proposed by (Leeper 1991), for stability under learning of the
rational expectations equilibria (REE). Our ﬁrst result is that the
ﬁscalist REE in the model of (McCallum 2001) is not locally stable
under learning. In contrast, in the setting of (Leeper 1991), diﬀerent
possibilities can arise. We ﬁnd, in particular, that there are parameter
domains for which the ﬁscal theory solution, in which ﬁscal variables
aﬀect the price level, can be a stable outcome under learning. However,
for other parameter domains the monetarist solution is instead the
stable equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Interactions between ﬁscal and monetary policy in the determination of the
price level have been the object of a great deal of new research in recent
years. One relatively new strand of research, the ﬁscal theory of the price
level, asserts that ﬁscal policy can have an important inﬂuence on the price
level in models in which one might expect prices to depend only on monetary
variables. An extreme speciﬁc case of the ﬁscalist theory asserts that, in
certain speciﬁc circumstances, ﬁscal variables can fully determine the price
level independently of monetary variables.1
Clearly, this extreme result is the polar opposite of the monetarist con-
tention that the price level and the inﬂation rate depend primarily on mone-
tary variables. It is thus not surprising that the ﬁscalist approach has aroused
a great deal debate and controversy. These debates consider various aspects
of the theory. One point of debate concerns the extreme speciﬁc case, in
which the price level follows an explosive path. (McCallum 2001) has argued
that this ﬁscalist equilibrium is an implausible “bubble equilibrium.”2
The inﬂuence of ﬁscal variables on the price level is, however, not limited
to extreme cases in which the system is non-stationary. In a local analysis
around a unique steady state (Leeper 1991) made an important distinction
between “active” and “passive” policies (the precise deﬁnitions will be given
below). In a standard model he showed that two combinations, either (i)
active monetary and passive ﬁscal policy or (ii) active ﬁscal and passive
monetary policy yield determinacy i.e. a unique stationary rational expecta-
tions equilibrium (REE). In case (i) the usual monetarist view that inﬂation
depends only on monetary policy is conﬁrmed. However, case (ii) is ﬁscalist
in the sense that ﬁscal policy, in addition to monetary policy, has an eﬀect on
the inﬂation rate. (Leeper 1991) also showed that the steady state is indeter-
1
For a long list of references on the ﬁscal theory of prices, see (Woodford 2001),
(Cochrane 1999) and (Cochrane 2000).
2
Another point of controversy evolves around the nature of intertemporal budget con-
straint of the government, compare e.g. on one hand (Buiter 1998), (Buiter 1999) and on
the other Section 2 of (Woodford 2001).
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minate, with multiple stationary solutions, when both policies are passive,
while the economy is explosive when both policies are active.
As already noted, the ﬁscal theory of the price level is subject to debate
and thus the existing literature is not very conclusive about its signiﬁcance.
Indeed, equilibrium analysis can shed only limited light on the issues and
further criteria on the plausibility of diﬀerent REE are likely to be useful in
assessing the possible outcomes suggested by the ﬁscal theory. The learn-
ing approach to macroeconomics, which has been developed in recent years3,
provides a criterion to select “reasonable” outcomes when multiple REE ex-
ist and the approach is also useful in cases with unique REE as a way to
assess the plausibility of an equilibrium. In this paper we re-examine some
central results of the ﬁscal theory of the price level from a learning viewpoint.
Generally speaking, this view asserts that the REE of interest are those that
are stable outcomes of a learning process in which agents might temporarily
deviate from rational expectations, respond to these mistakes and eventually
come to have correct forecast functions.
We investigate both the rational explosive inﬂation paths studied by
(McCallum 2001), and the classiﬁcation of ﬁscal and monetary policies pro-
posed by (Leeper 1991), for stability under learning of the REE. We ﬁnd
that the ﬁscalist REE in the model of (McCallum 2001) is not locally sta-
ble under learning, while the monetarist equilibrium is stable under learning
when ﬁscal policy is altered to be “Ricardian.” In contrast, in the setting
of (Leeper 1991), various cases arise. For the most plausible region of policy
parameters the results are very natural for policy combinations that imply
the existence of a unique stationary REE. The monetarist REE is stable un-
der learning when monetary policy is active and ﬁscal policy is passive. If
instead ﬁscal policy is active and monetary policy is passive, then the ﬁs-
cal theory solution, in which ﬁscal variables aﬀect the price level, is stable
under learning. In both of these cases the stable REE is the unique station-
ary solution. For other combinations of monetary and ﬁscal policy within
the plausible parameter region the results are perhaps more surprising: for
some parameter values all REE are unstable while for other parameter val-
ues there is incipient convergence to an explosive path. Our results clearly
indicate that policy formulation should take into account the local stability
properties, under learning, of the diﬀerent REE.
3
See (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) for a recent treatise. Surveys of the literature are
provided e.g. in (Evans and Honkapohja 1999), (Marimon 1997) and (Sargent 1993).
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2 The Model
We consider a stochastic optimizing model that is close to (Leeper 1991)
and (McCallum 2001). For the basic model, notation and speciﬁcation of
monetary and ﬁscal policy rules we follow Leeper, but we use McCallum’s
more general class of utility functions and also his timing in which utility
depends on beginning of period money balances.4
Households are assumed to maximize
maxE
t
{
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
[
(1− σ
1
)−1c1−σ1
s
+A(1− σ
2
)−1(m
s−1
π−1
s
)1−σ2
]}
.
Here c
s
denotes consumption in period s and m
s
= M
s
/P
s
, where M
s
is
the money supply and P
s
is the price level at s. Note that real money
balances enter utility as m
s−1
π−1
s
= (M
s−1
/P
s−1
)(P
s−1
/P
s
) = M
s−1
/P
s
. The
household’s budget constraint is
c
s
+m
s
+ b
s
+ τ
s
= y +m
s−1
π−1
s
+R
s−1
π−1
s
b
s−1
, (1)
where b
s
= B
s
/P
s
, π
s
= P
s
/P
s−1
is the gross inﬂation rate and τ
s
is real
lump-sum taxes. Note that B
s
is the end of period s nominal stock of bonds.
R
s−1
is the gross nominal interest rate on bonds, set at time s− 1 but paid
in the beginning of period s. The household has a constant endowment y of
consumer goods each period.
We assume that there is a constant ﬂow of government purchases g ≥
0. As shown in Appendix A.1, household optimality and market clearing
conditions imply the Fisher equation
R−1
t
= βE
t
π−1
t+1
(2)
and the equation for money market equilibrium, in period t,
Aβm−σ2
t
E
t
πσ2−1
t+1
= (y − g)−σ1(1− βE
t
π−1
t+1
). (3)
In addition, the equilibrium must satisfy the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
βtm
t+1
= 0 and lim
t→∞
βtb
t+1
= 0. (4)
4
The question of whether beginning- or end-of-period real balances leads to subtle dif-
ferences in the model and can in some cases have major implications, compare (Carlstrom
and Fuerst 2001).
4
The above equations (2) and (3) are usually derived under rational ex-
pectations (RE), but in Appendix A.1 it is shown that they also hold in a
temporary equilibrium with given subjective expectations.
The speciﬁcation of the model is completed by giving the government
budget constraint and policy rules. The government budget constraint, writ-
ten in real terms, is
b
t
+m
t
+ τ
t
= g +m
t−1
π−1
t
+R
t−1
π−1
t
b
t−1
. (5)
For ﬁscal policy we use Leeper’s tax rate rule
τ
t
= γ
0
+ γb
t−1
+ ψ
t
. (6)
Monetary policy is given either by Leeper’s interest rate rule
R
t
= α
0
+ απ
t
+ θ
t
, (7)
or by a simple ﬁxed money supply rule
M
t
= M + θ
t
, (8)
as in (Sims 1999) or (McCallum 2001). Here ψ
t
and θ
t
are exogenous random
shocks, which for simplicity are to be iid with mean zero. (We will later
brieﬂy take up the case where the shocks are V AR(1).)
In the terminology of (Leeper 1991), ﬁscal policy is “active” if
∣∣β−1 − γ∣∣ >
1 and “passive” if
∣∣β−1 − γ∣∣ < 1, while under (7) monetary policy is active if
|αβ| > 1 and passive if |αβ| < 1. As noted by (Sims 1999), it is also natural
to refer to monetary policy as active if the policy rule (8) is followed in place
of (7). We want to consider the RE solutions under diﬀerent policy regimes
and then to analyze their stability under learning. Leeper emphasized the
cases of AM/PF (active monetary/passive ﬁscal policy) and AF/PM (active
ﬁscal/passive monetary policy) in which, as discussed below, there is a unique
stationary solution. We will be particularly interested in these cases, but will
also consider explosive regimes of the model and regimes with indeterminacy,
i.e. with multiple stationary solutions.
3 Bubbles and the Fiscal Theory of Prices
We begin our analysis with consideration of a prominent case of the ﬁscal
theory of prices in which the price level path is entirely determined by ﬁscal
5
policy and does not depend on monetary policy, e.g. see (Sims 1999) or
(McCallum 2001). In this section we use a nonstochastic version of the
model in which ψ
t
≡ 0 and θ
t
≡ 0. Monetary policy is given by (8) and ﬁscal
policy is given by (6) with γ = 0. Thus policy reduces to
τ
t
= τ and M
t
= M ,
which is a special case in which both monetary and ﬁscal policy are active.
With a nonstochastic model it is natural to assume point expectations,
so that (3) becomes
m
t
= (Aβ)1/σ2(y − g)σ1/σ2[(1− β/πe
t+1
)(πe
t+1
)1−σ2]−1/σ2.
With constant nominal money stock we can write
P
t
= M(Aβ)−1/σ2(y − g)−σ1/σ2(πe
t+1
)(1−σ2)/σ2[1− β(πe
t+1
)−1]1/σ2
or
P
t
= Dˆ(πe
t+1
)(1−σ2)/σ2[1− β(πe
t+1
)−1]1/σ2, (9)
where Dˆ ≡M(Aβ)−1/σ2(y − g)−σ1/σ2.
Consider ﬁrst the perfect foresight solutions. Under perfect foresight we
have R−1
t
= βπ−1
t+1
. With a constant money supply the bond equation (5)
reduces to
b
t
= g − τ
t
+ β−1b
t−1
.
With τ
t
= τ this equation is explosive and will violate the transversality
conditions unless b
1
= B
1
/P
1
= (τ − g)/(β−1 − 1). With B
1
given by an
initial condition this equation uniquely determines, under perfect foresight,
the initial price level P
1
. Under perfect foresight the price equation (9)
becomes
P
t
= Dˆ(P
t+1
/P
t
)(1−σ2)/σ2[1− β(P
t+1
/P
t
)−1]1/σ2. (10)
This equation has a steady state at Pˆ = Dˆ(1 − β)1/σ2, but is explosive
and will diverge unless B
1
happens to be such that P
1
= Pˆ . However, for
0 < σ
2
< 1 and initial P
1
> Pˆ we obtain an explosive price path P
t
→∞ that
is consistent with the transversality conditions and the equilibrium equations.
In this “ﬁscalist” equilibrium, the initial price level P
1
= B
1
(β−1−1)/(τ −g)
is determined by ﬁscal variables and P
t
follows an explosive “bubble” price
path despite a constant money stock.
6
McCallum argues that this solution is less plausible than an alternative
“bubble-free” monetarist solution P
t
= Pˆ and b
t+1
= 0 for all t = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
in which (with our timing) the level of real taxes τ
t
adjusts to satisfy τ
1
=
g+β−1b
1
and τ
t
= g for t = 2, 3, . . .. One way to interpret McCallum’s view,
as he acknowledges, is as an argument that ﬁscal policy must be Ricardian
for all feasible sequences (not just for equilibrium sequences).5 However, the
status of the ﬁscalist solution in this model remains controversial.
3.1 Fiscalist Case Under Learning
We now take a diﬀerent tack, which nonetheless comes to the same conclusion
as (McCallum 2001), i.e. that the ﬁscalist solution is not plausible in the
case under scrutiny. We suppose that the government can indeed commit to
τ
t
= τ for all t = 1, 2, 3, . . . , so that the only equilibrium perfect foresight
price path is the explosive ﬁscalist solution given above. However, we drop
the perfect foresight assumption and ask if the price path is learnable under a
natural adaptive learning rule. Throughout Section 3 we assume 0 < σ
2
< 1
so that there can exist an equilibrium perfect foresight explosive price path.
We ﬁrst note that it follows from (10) that P
t
→∞ implies that π
t+1
→∞
along the perfect foresight path.6 It follows that the perfect foresight price
path in this case is approximately given by
P
t+1
= D¯P
1/(1−σ
2
)
t
, where D¯ = Dˆ−σ2/(1−σ2).
From (9) we also have that the approximate temporary equilibrium for large
πe
t+1
is given by
P
t
= Dˆ(πe
t+1
)(1−σ2)/σ2 (11)
Thus, on or near the bubble paths, prices asymptotically just depend on
expected inﬂation, independently of the rest of the system, as speciﬁed by
(11). We now show:
Proposition 1 Under constant taxes and fixed money supply, the explosive
fiscalist price path is unstable under learning.
5
For a related argument see (Buiter 1999).
6
If instead we had P
t
→ ∞ and P
t+1
/P
t
→ πˆ where 0 < πˆ < ∞, the right-hand
side of (10) would tend to a ﬁnite value. This is a contradiction. (If πˆ = 0, there would
be deﬂation i.e. P
t+1
< P
t
for suﬃciently large t, which would violate the assumption
P
t
→∞.)
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The argument is as follows. We use the ﬁnding in the literature on adap-
tive learning, see (Evans and Honkapohja 2001), that stability under adap-
tive learning is generally determined by “expectational stability” (E-stability)
conditions. Suppose households base their forecasts on a Perceived Law of
Motion (PLM) of the form
P
t
= DP φ
t−1
. (12)
(We could restrict attention to φ = σ
2
/(1 − σ
2
) but it is also easy to treat
both D and φ as PLM parameters). Then
P e
t
= DP φ
t−1
and P e
t+1
= D (P e
t
)φ = D1+φP φ
2
t−1
so that
πe
t+1
= P e
t+1
/P e
t
= DφP
φ(φ−1)
t−1
. (13)
We are here treating the information set at the time expectations are formed
as including P
t−1
but not P
t
. (However, including current P
t
in the informa-
tion set would not make the price bubble paths stable).
Inserting into (11) gives the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) that is gener-
ated by the speciﬁed PLM:
P
t
= Dˆ(DφP
φ(φ−1)
t−1
)(1−σ2)/σ2 = DˆDφ(1−σ2)/σ2P
φ(φ−1)(1−σ
2
)/σ
2
t−1
.
This equation deﬁnes a mapping from the PLM parameters (D, φ) to the
implied ALM parameters, given by
T (D, φ) = (DˆDφ(1−σ2)/σ2, φ(φ− 1)(1− σ
2
)/σ
2
).
E-stability is deﬁned in terms of the stability of the (notional time) diﬀeren-
tial equation
d
dτ
(D, φ) = T (D, φ)− (D,φ)
at the equilibrium of interest.
The bubble ﬁxed point is given by φ¯ = (1−σ
2
)−1 and D¯. The roots of the
JacobianmatrixDT are (2φ−1)(1−σ
2
)/σ
2
and φ((1−σ
2
)/σ
2
)DˆDφ(1−σ2)/σ2−1.
At the bubble solution these roots are 1 + 1/σ
2
and 1/σ
2
. Since both roots
are larger than one it follows that the bubble solution is not E-stable. Note
that if we impose φ = (1−σ
2
)−1 and just examine E-stability of D¯ we obtain
the root T ′(D¯) = 1/σ
2
> 1 so that the bubble continues to be E-unstable.7
7
There is also a ﬁxed point of T at φ = 0 and Q =
ˆ
D, but at the monetarist steady
state the approximation based on large π
e
t+1
is unsatisfactory. Section 3.2 develops the
appropriate approximation.
8
We remark that the basis for our stability analysis relies on using natural
but simple rules for decision-making and learning. These decision rules are
discussed in Appendix A.1. In particular, the household demand for real
balances depends only on the interest rate and the expected rate of inﬂation
over the coming period. More elaborate decision (and learning) rules can
be imagined in which households choose their money demands based on a
forecast of the whole future price path.8 However, our decision rule is natural
because it ensures that the household attempts each period to meet the ﬁrst-
order condition for maximizing utility given by the usual Euler equation.
Our instability results indicate a lack of robustness of the perfect foresight
price path, to small deviations, under simple learning rules of a type that are
known to yield stability in other contexts, and contrasts with cases below in
which these learning rules converge.
3.2 Monetarist Solution under Learning
We now consider learning stability of the monetarist solution suggested by
(McCallum 2001), which arises when money supply is constant and the gov-
ernment pays oﬀ the debt immediately, never resorting to bond ﬁnance there-
after. Clearly, this is an extreme form of Ricardian policies.9 In consequence,
there are no bonds in the economy and the only equation of interest is (9).
We analyze learning following the procedure above. The solution of in-
terest is the steady state
P¯ = Dˆ(1− β)1/σ2 with π
t
= 1.
We now log-linearize (9), which yields the approximation
lnP
t
= ln P¯ +
(
1− σ
2
σ
2
+
β
σ
2
(1− β)−1
)
ln(πe
t+1
)
or
P
t
= P¯ (πe
t+1
)L, (14)
where L = 1−σ2
σ
2
+ β
σ
2
(1− β)−1.
8
For example, (Woodford 2001) considers an analysis along these lines, drawing on the
calculation equilibrium approach of (Evans and Ramey 1998).
9
Under the perfect foresight monetarist solution there is no seignorage since π
t
= 1 and
τ
t
= g for all t. Under learning lump sum taxes adjust each period to oﬀset seignorage.
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Again we consider PLMs of the form (12), so that inﬂation expectations
are given by (13). Inserting these into (14) leads to the ALM
P
t
= P¯DLφP
Lφ(φ−1)
t−1
.
The mapping from the PLM to the ALM is thus
T (D, φ) = (P¯DLφ, Lφ(φ− 1)).
The monetarist steady state is the ﬁxed point D = P¯ , φ = 0. Applying the
deﬁnition of E-stability as before, it is easy to verify:
Proposition 2 Under constant money supply and the Ricardian fiscal policy
τ
1
= g + β−1b
1
and τ
t
= g for t = 2, 3, . . ., the monetarist solution is stable
under learning.
3.3 Discussion
The results of this section cast doubt upon the plausibility of the ﬁscal theory
of the price level for the special case of constant money and taxes. If the
government follows Non-Ricardian policies and the money supply is held
ﬁxed, the only REE is the explosive bubble path, but the equilibrium is not
stable under learning. The economy under the speciﬁed learning rule may
indeed follow some explosive path for a period of time, but this path will not
converge to the ﬁscalist solution.
However, there are other policy regimes in which the ﬁscal theory of
the price level has been proposed as the relevant solution. In particular,
(Leeper 1991) studied situations in which the inﬂation rate is aﬀected by
government tax and bond variables but with ﬁnite steady state inﬂation. We
now turn to an analysis of learning under policy rules (6) and (7) based on
a linearization around the steady state. We will be particularly interested
in the policy regimes in which the interaction of monetary and ﬁscal policy
rules leads to a unique stationary solution under rational expectations, but
we will also consider other policy regimes.
4 Linearized Model with Stochastic Shocks
We thus return to monetary policy following an interest rate rule, with the
system speciﬁed by (3) and (5) and the policy rules given by (6) and (7).
10
This system is nonlinear, but in a neighborhood of the steady state, we can
analyze its linearization. In Appendix A.2 it is shown that the linearized
system takes the form
π
t
= (αβ)−1E∗
t
π
t+1
− α−1θ
t
(15)
0 = b
t
+ ϕ
1
π
t
+ ϕ
2
π
t−1
− (β−1 − γ)b
t−1
+ ψ
t
+ ϕ
3
θ
t
+ ϕ
4
θ
t−1
, (16)
where E∗
t
π
t+1
denotes inﬂation expectations formed at t. The notation
E∗
t
π
t+1
is used to emphasize that the reduced form (15)-(16) applies whether
or not expectations are rational. The coeﬃcients ϕ
1
, . . . , ϕ
4
are given in Ap-
pendix A.2.10 From now on we make the assumptions α = 0, αβ = 1, γβ = 1
and β−1 − γ = 1.
In Appendix A.3 it is shown that the regular case, in which there is a
unique stationary RE solution, arises when either |αβ| > 1 and
∣
∣β−1 − γ
∣
∣ < 1,
i.e. active monetary policy and passive ﬁscal policy (AM/PF), or |αβ| < 1
and
∣
∣β−1 − γ
∣
∣ > 1, i.e. active ﬁscal policy and passive monetary policy
(AF/PM). Either condition |αβ| > 1 or
∣
∣β−1 − γ
∣
∣ > 1 leads to a linear
restriction of the form
π
t
= K
1
b
t
+K
2
θ
t
(17)
when non-explosiveness of the solution is imposed. This equation together
with (16) deﬁnes the unique stationary solution in the regular case.
In the AM/PF regime we obtain K
1
= 0 and K
2
= −α−1, so that
π
t
= −α−1θ
t
.
We will refer to this solution as the “monetarist solution”, since π
t
is inde-
pendent of both b
t−1
and the tax shock ψ
t
. In the AF/PM regime we obtain
the expression
π
t
=
αβϕ
1
+ ϕ
2
β−1 − γ − αβ
b
t
+K
2
θ
t
. (18)
From (18) and (16) it is apparent that inﬂation now depends on b
t−1
and ψ
t
as well as on monetary policy. We therefore refer to this REE as the “ﬁscalist
solution.”
Besides the regular cases, there are two other regimes possible, depending
on policy parameters. If |αβ| < 1 and
∣
∣β−1 − γ
∣
∣ < 1, so that both policies are
10
These reduced form equations are identical to the reduced form given by Leeper, but
with coeﬃcients that diﬀer slightly due to diﬀerences in timing and the more general utility
function used here. See (Leeper 1991), p. 136.
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IN IN
EX EX
EXEX
AM/PFAM/PF
AF/PM AF/PM
AF/PM AF/PM
0
α
γ
1−β1−− β
11 −−β
11 +−β
Figure 1: Determinate, indeterminate and explosive regions
passive, the model is “irregular” or “indeterminate,” with multiple stationary
solutions. If |αβ| > 1 and
∣∣β−1 − γ∣∣ > 1, so that both policies are active, the
model is said to be “explosive,” and there are no stationary solutions. As
will be seen, in the linearized model both monetarist and ﬁscalist solutions
always exist, but need not be stationary. The diﬀerent regimes are shown
in Figure 1, where IN and EX refer to indeterminate and explosive regions,
respectively.
Clearly the solutions can also be written in a vector autoregressive form,
and this is more convenient for the analysis of learning which we now un-
dertake. Again we will focus on E-stability conditions. Since we are now
examining stationary solutions to a linearized multivariate model, the results
of Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001) show that E-stability condi-
tions govern the convergence of least squares and related real-time learning
schemes.
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4.1 REE as Fixed Points
Introducing the notation y
t
= (π
t
, b
t
)′, the linearized model (15)-(16) can be
written in the vector form
y
t
= ME∗
t
y
t+1
+Ny
t−1
+ Pv
t
+Rv
t−1
, (19)
where
M =
(
(αβ)−1 0
−ϕ
1
(αβ)−1 0
)
, N =
(
0 0
−ϕ
2
β−1 − γ
)
,
P =
(
−α−1 0
ϕ
1
α−1 − ϕ
3
−1
)
, R =
(
0 0
−ϕ
4
0
)
, v
t
=
(
θ
t
ψ
t
)
.
We consider PLMs of the form
y
t
= A+By
t−1
+ Cv
t
+Dv
t−1
. (20)
These PLMs exclude exogenous sunspot variables by assumption (we will
brieﬂy consider such solutions below). Computing the expectation11
E∗
t
y
t+1
= A+B(A +By
t−1
+ Cv
t
+Dv
t−1
) +Dv
t
= (I +B)A+B2y
t−1
+ (BC +D)v
t
+BDv
t−1
and inserting into (19) we obtain the implied ALM
y
t
= M(I +B)A+ (MB2 +N)y
t−1
+(M(BC +D) + P )v
t
+ (MBD +R)v
t−1
.
Thus the mapping from the PLM to the ALM is
A −→ M(I +B)A
B −→ MB2 +N
C −→ MBC +MD + P
D −→ MBD +R
and the ﬁxed points of this mapping correspond to REE of the form (20).
11
We make the frequently employed assumption that when agents compute forecasts,
using the PLM, they observe current values of the exogenous variables, but only lagged
values of the endogenous variables. The key results do not change under the alternative
information assumption that agents also observe current endogenous variables, see below.
13
The second component of the mapping can have more than one solution.
Given any solution for B the ﬁrst component gives the unique solution A = 0,
provided I −M(I + B) is nonsingular. Similarly, for given B the third and
fourth components of the mapping are linear equations for C andD. Because
of the form of M and N we have the result:
Proposition 3 There are three types of REE taking the form (20), as listed
below.
I. B = N , C = P and D = R with A = 0. This is the monetarist
solution.
II. B = χ−1
(
−(βγ + αβ2 − 1)ϕ
2
−β−1(βγ − 1)(βγ + αβ2 − 1)
βϕ
2
(αβϕ
1
+ ϕ
2
) (βγ − 1)(αβϕ
1
+ ϕ
2
)
)
,
where χ = (βγ − 1)ϕ
1
− βϕ
2
, A = 0 and C and D are also uniquely
determined by the ﬁxed point.12 It can be veriﬁed that this is a way
of representing the ﬁscalist solution. Although this may appear to be
a complicated representation, it can be veriﬁed that the eigenvalues
of B are 0 and αβ. The zero eigenvalue corresponds to the static
linear relationship (18) between π
t
and b
t
, which can be used to obtain
alternative representations of the REE.
III. B =
(
αβ 0
−(ϕ
1
αβ + ϕ
2
) β−1 − γ
)
, A = 0. For C and D the solution
is not unique. For D there is a two-dimensional continuum and, given
a value for D, the equation for C also yields a two-dimensional con-
tinuum. We call this class of solutions the non-fundamental solutions,
because of the indeterminacy in the C and D coeﬃcients. We remark
that this solution set can be expanded to allow for dependence on an
exogenous sunspot variable.
In the case of AM/PF policy, the monetarist solution is stationary, while
the ﬁscalist solution and non-fundamental solutions are explosive. In con-
trast, in the case of AF/PM policy, the ﬁscalist solution is stationary while
the monetarist solution and non-fundamental solutions are explosive. In the
case of PM/PF policy all the REE are stationary. We now turn to an exam-
ination of whether these solutions are stable under learning.
12
Explicit formulas for C and D are available on request. This assumes χ  = 0.
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4.2 Stability under Learning
Let ξ = (A,B,C,D) denote the parameters of the PLM and let T (ξ) denote
the corresponding values of the ALM given by the above mapping. The
three types of RE solutions above correspond to ﬁxed points of this map.
Local stability under Least Squares learning is determined by E-stability
conditions, deﬁned as the conditions for local asymptotic stability, under the
notional time diﬀerential equation
dξ/dτ = T (ξ)− ξ, (21)
of the RE solution (or solution set) of interest.
We now present the results giving stability under learning of the diﬀerent
solutions:
Proposition 4 (I) The monetarist solution is stable under learning if
(αβ)−1 < 1 and
β−1 − γ
αβ
< 1,
(II) The fiscalist solution is stable under learning if
β−1 − γ
αβ
> 1 and
γ + 1− β−1
αβ
< 0,
and
(III) The non-fundamental solutions are not stable under learning.
We establish this proposition by deriving the E-stability conditions. First
we note that the B component in this diﬀerential equation is nonlinear, with
local stability determined by its linearization at the ﬁxed point of interest.
The B, C and D components are matrix-valued and need to be vectorized.
Moreover, it is seen that the B component of (21) is an independent sub-
system, the A and D subsystems, respectively, depend on B, and the C
subsystem depends on both B and D. The stability conditions for (21) can
be given in terms of the following matrices13
DT
A
= M(I + B¯),
DT
B
= B¯ ′ ⊗M + I ⊗MB¯,
DT
C
= I ⊗MB¯,
DT
D
= I ⊗MB¯,
13
For details on the technique, see Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
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where B¯ denotes the value of B at the REE of interest and ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product.
The E-stability condition for REE of type I and II is that the real parts
of all eigenvalues of all four matrices DT
i
, i = A,B,C,D, are less than one.
For the class of non-fundamental solutions III the matrices DT
C
and DT
D
will have some eigenvalues equal to one, due to the continuum of solutions.
A necessary condition for E-stability is that the non-zero eigenvalues of the
four matrices have real parts less than one.
The explicit E-stability conditions for the three types of REE are then
obtained as follows.
I. The monetarist solution: The eigenvalues of DT
A
are 0 and (αβ)−1.
The non-zero eigenvalue of DT
B
is β
−1
−γ
αβ
. All eigenvalues of DT
C
and
DT
D
are zero. This yields the E-stability conditions given.
II. The ﬁscalist solution: The non-zero eigenvalues of DT
i
, i = A,B,C,D,
are 1 + γ+1−β
−1
αβ
, 1 + γ−β
−1
αβ
and 2 + γ−β
−1
αβ
. This yields the E-stability
conditions given. Although the matrix B¯ depends on ϕ
1
and ϕ
2
, the
eigenvalues of DT
i
, i = A,B,C,D, are in fact independent of ϕ
1
and
ϕ
2
, as can be veriﬁed using e.g. Mathematica (routines available on
request).
III. The non-fundamental solutions are not E-stable, since DT
B
has an
eigenvalue equal to 2.
4.3 Economic Implications
Looking at the economic model, it is evident that the most natural policy
rules entail the parameter restrictions α > 0 and γ ≥ 0. α > 0 means that
the nominal interest rate responds positively to current inﬂation and γ > 0
means that the lump-sum tax responds positively to beginning-of-period debt
b
t−1
. In the case γ = 0 taxes are set independently of the debt level. Realistic
values of γ would also appear to be below β−1, since γ > β−1 implies that, at
the non-stochastic steady state, any shock to debt levels would lead to a tax
increase that would more than pay oﬀ the debt, including interest, within
one period. We therefore focus on the region α > 0 and γ ≥ 0 of the policy
parameter space, followed by a brief discussion of the other cases.
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Figure 2: Regions of E-stable REE
Figure 2 shows the results on learning stability for the monetarist and
ﬁscalist solutions in this part of the parameter space. In the ﬁgure M indi-
cates that the monetarist solution is stable under learning. F indicates that
the ﬁscalist solution is stable and U indicates that neither solution is stable
under learning. In none of the areas are both solutions simultaneously stable
under learning. In the shaded region α > β−1 and 0 ≤ γ < β−1 − 1 the
solutions are not stationary.
Within the parameter region described by Figure 2, the AM/PF regime
arises with α > β−1 and β−1 − 1 < γ < β−1. In this regime the monetarist
equilibrium is the unique stationary solution and it is also stable under learn-
ing. In the AF/PM regime, given by 0 < α < β−1 and 0 ≤ γ < β−1 − 1, the
ﬁscalist REE is the unique stationary solution and is stable under learning.
The indeterminacy region with policy combination PM/PF is given by
0 < α < β−1 and β−1 − 1 < γ < β−1. Here, while both solutions are
stationary, they fail to be stable under learning.14
14
Cases in which policy leads to unstable REE under learning have appeared in the
literature, see in particular the treatment of interest rate pegging by (Howitt 1992) and
the more recent discussion of (Evans and Honkapohja 2003).
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The shaded explosive region with policy combination AM/AF is also di-
vided into two cases with either the ﬁscalist or the monetarist solution being
stable under learning. We emphasize that our results are local, i.e. they are
valid only in a neighborhood of the steady state. Our results for the shaded
thus give only a limited amount of information because the solutions diverge
from the steady state. A full analysis of learning would require examination
of the nonlinear model. However, the results for this region do suggest an
incipient tendency for the economy under learning to follow the indicated
explosive equilibrium.
Note that active monetary policy requires α > β−1. This is a somewhat
stronger condition than given by a usual formulation of the “Taylor princi-
ple”. If instead 1 < α < β−1 the monetarist solution becomes unstable (with
either the economy becoming unstable or tending to the ﬁscalist solution).
4.3.1 Further Comments
We make a few observations about learning stability in the other regions of
the policy parameters not covered by Figure 2. Throughout the AM/PF
region the monetarist equilibrium is stable under learning. This solution is
also stable in part of the left IN region of Figure 1. The ﬁscalist solution is
stable in the top-left and bottom-right AF/PM regions and it is also stable
in a part of the left IN region of Figure 1. There is no stable equilibrium in
the top-right AF/PM region even though this is a regular case in which the
ﬁscalist REE is the unique stationary solution. Finally and most surprisingly,
in the bottom-left AF/PM region the explosive monetarist equilibrium is
stable while the stationary ﬁscalist solution is unstable under learning.
For convenience we have assumed that the exogenous shocks are white
noise. Assume instead that they follow a jointly stationary ﬁrst order vector
autoregression. As we note in Appendix A.4, this imposes additional require-
ments for learning stability of equilibria. In some cases the stability regions
for model parameters are unchanged. However, one can also ﬁnd cases in
which the additional requirements tighten the domain of stability for the
parameters.
4.3.2 Alternative Information Assumption
The preceding analysis of stability under learning was based on the assump-
tion that, when forming expectations, agents observe the current values of
18
exogenous but only the lagged values of the endogenous variables. In the
literature it is sometimes alternatively assumed that agents can condition
their forecasts also on current endogenous variables, and we now explore the
implications of agents having access to current endogenous variables in their
expectations.
The reduced form and the PLM are still (19) and (20), respectively. How-
ever, the forecasts of the agents are now
E∗
t
y
t+1
= A+By
t
+Dv
t
,
since the shocks are taken to be iid. Substituting E∗
t
y
t+1
into (19) implies
the ALM
y
t
= (I −MB)−1[MA +Ny
t−1
+ (P +mD)v
t
+Rv
t−1
],
provided I −MB is invertible, so that the mapping from the PLM to the
ALM is
A → (I −MB)−1MA
B → (I −MB)−1N
C → (I −MB)−1(P +MD)
D → (I −MB)−1R.
The E-stability now stipulates that all of the eigenvalues of the matrices
DT
A
= (I −MB¯)−1M,
DT
B
= [(I −MB¯)−1N ]′ ⊗ [(I −MB¯)−1M ]
have real parts less than one at an REE (A¯, B¯, C¯, D¯).15 For the diﬀerent
types of REE we obtain the following explicit E-stability conditions:16
I. The monetarist solution:
(αβ)−1 < 1 and
β−1 − γ
αβ
< 1.
15
There are only these two matrix conditions, since the C and D components of the
ODE deﬁned by the mapping are necessarily locally stable, provided that the system for
B is convergent.
16
The non-fundamental REE are at the singularities of I −MB and we do not examine
them further.
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II. The ﬁscalist solution:
β
1− βγ
< 1 and
αβ2
1− βγ
< 1.
In the economically relevant parameter region α > 0, 0 ≤ γ ≤ β−1 these
conditions yield the same cases of E-stability and -instability as the main
information assumption used in Section 4.2 and which are illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. Thus, throughout this parameter domain our stability and instability
results are robust to the choice of the information assumption.
5 Conclusions
We have considered local stability under learning of the rational expectations
solutions in a simple stochastic optimizing monetary model in which the in-
teraction between monetary and ﬁscal policy is central. Our ﬁrst ﬁnding was
that in the case of constant money supply and constant taxes, the equilib-
rium explosive price paths dictated by the ﬁscal theory of the price level are
not locally stable under learning. In contrast, if ﬁscal policy is Ricardian,
then the monetarist equilibrium is stable under learning. These particular
results appear to cast doubt on the plausibility of the ﬁscal theory.
We then examined an alternative setting in which interest rates are set as
a linear function of inﬂation and taxes are set as a linear function of real debt.
The usual monetarist solution is locally stable under learning in the active
monetary/passive ﬁscal policy regime in which it is the unique stationary
solution. On the other hand, the ﬁscalist solution, in which inﬂation depends
on the debt level and on tax shocks, is stable under learning for a plausible
subregion of the active ﬁscal/passive monetary regime, in which the ﬁscalist
solution is the unique stationary solution.
There are also regions of plausible policy parameter values in which the
economy is indeterminate, with multiple stationary solutions. However, in
this parameter domain none of the REE are stable under learning.
Overall, our results provide signiﬁcant, though limited, support for the
ﬁscalist solution. Whether the ﬁscalist solution emerges under learning de-
pends on the precise speciﬁcation of the ﬁscal and monetary policies. Careful
consideration of the interaction of these policies is therefore required to un-
derstand the qualitative characteristics of inﬂation and debt dynamics.
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A Appendix
A.1 Household Optimality Conditions and Temporary
Equilibrium
Deﬁne the variables W
t+1
= m
t
+ b
t
and x
t+1
= m
t
. Following (Chow 1996),
Section 2.3, introduce the Lagrange multipliers λ
t
for the budget constraint
and µ
t
for the equation x
t+1
= m
t
and write the Lagrangian
L = E
t
∞∑
t=0
{βt
[
(1− σ
1
)−1c1−σ1
t
+A(1− σ
2
)−1(x
t
π−1
t
)1−σ2
]
+
βt+1λ
t+1
[W
t+1
− y + c
t
+ τ
t
− x
t
π−1
t
−R
t−1
π−1
t
(W
t
− x
t
)]
+βt+1µ
t+1
(x
t+1
−m
t
)}.
Here W
t
, x
t
are the state and c
t
,m
t
the control variables.
The ﬁrst order conditions are
c−σ1
t
− βE
t
λ
t+1
= 0, (22)
E
t
µ
t+1
= 0, (23)
λ
t
= β(R
t−1
π−1
t
)E
t
λ
t+1
, (24)
µ
t
= Aπ−1
t
(x
t
π−1
t
)−σ2 + β(π−1
t
−R
t−1
π−1
t
)E
t
λ
t+1
. (25)
In addition, the household’s optimal choices must satisfy the transversality
conditions (4).
These equations hold under RE, but they also hold under any subjective
expectations that satisfy the law of iterated expectations. We now derive the
consumption and money demand equations which determine the temporary
equilibrium under subjective expectations. In (25) one eliminates E
t
λ
t+1
by
substituting (24) into (25). Next, advance the resulting equation one period
and use (23), which leads to
Am−σ2
t
E∗
t
πσ2−1
t+1
+ (R−1
t
− 1)β−1c−σ1
t
= 0. (26)
Here we use E∗
t
(.) to emphasize that the equation holds for subjective as well
as rational expectations.
To derive the Euler equation for consumption, combine (22) and (24) to
obtain λ
t
= R
t−1
π−1
t
c−σ1
t
and
c−σ1
t
= βR
t
E∗
t
(π−1
t+1
c−σ1
t+1
).
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Assuming that all agents have identical expectations, market clearing im-
plies that c
t
= y − g for all agents. It is, therefore, natural to assume that
agents forecast their future consumption as c
t+1
= y − g. We arrive at the
consumption schedule
c−σ1
t
= (y − g)−σ1βR
t
E∗
t
π−1
t+1
.
This speciﬁes consumption demand as a function of the interest rate and
expected inﬂation. Substitution of this equation into (26) gives the money
demand schedule as a function of the interest rate and expected inﬂation:
Am−σ2
t
E∗
t
πσ2−1
t+1
+ (R−1
t
− 1)(y − g)−σ1R
t
E∗
t
π−1
t+1
= 0. (27)
Given expected inﬂation, the temporary equilibrium is obtained by im-
posing market clearing, so that c
t
= y−g, which immediately gives the Fisher
equation
R−1
t
= βE∗
t
π−1
t+1
. (28)
Under RE this gives equation (2). Finally, substitution into (27) yields
Aβm−σ2
t
E∗
t
πσ2−1
t+1
= (y − g)−σ1(1− βE∗
t
π−1
t+1
), (29)
which, together with money supply, determines the current price level. Under
RE we get (3).
A.2 Linearization
We ﬁrst give the linearization of the model. Rearranging (29) we can write
money market clearing as
m
t
= (Aβ)1/σ2(y − g)σ1/σ2[(1− βE∗
t
π−1
t+1
)(E∗
t
πσ2−1
t+1
)−1]−1/σ2. (30)
(30) is of the general form
m
t
= F [E∗
t
(f(π
t+1
), E∗
t
g(π
t+1
)],
where
F (x, y) = Cˆ(1− βx)−1/σ2y1/σ2, with
x = f(z) = z−1 and y = g(z) = zσ2−1.
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Here Cˆ = (Aβ)1/σ2(y − g)σ1/σ2.
Carrying out the diﬀerentiation we have
F
1
(x, y) = Cˆy1/σ2(−1/σ
2
)(1− βx)−1/σ2−1(−β),
F
2
(x, y) = Cˆ(1− βx)−1/σ2(1/σ
2
)y1/σ2−1
f ′(z) = −z−2, g′(z) = (σ
2
− 1)zσ2−2.
Thus, using the chain rule
dm = (F
1
f´ + F
2
g′)dz
at the nonstochastic steady state π, we have the linearization
m˜
t
=
[(
−Cˆβ
σ
2
)
(π − β)−(1+σ2)/σ2 +
(
σ
2
− 1
σ
2
)
Cˆ(π − β)−1/σ2πσ2−2
]
E∗
t
π˜
t+1
or
m˜
t
≡ CE∗
t
π˜
t+1
. (31)
Here m˜
t
and E∗
t
π˜
t+1
denote the deviations from the nonstochastic steady
state.
We also need to linearize the Fisher relation (28) at the nonstochastic
steady state π, R. We have
0 = −βRπ−2E∗
t
π˜
t+1
+ βπ−1R˜
t
,
where R˜
t
is the deviation from the nonstochastic steady state. Since the
Fisher equation also holds at the nonstochastic steady state, i.e. βRπ−1 = 1,
we get
E∗
t
π˜
t+1
= βR˜
t
,
which can be substituted into (31) to yield
m˜
t
≡ CβR˜
t
.
This last expression can be used in the linearized government budget con-
straint.
Finally, we linearize the budget constraint, taking note that m
t
is a func-
tion of R
t
. We get
0 = b˜
t
+
∂m
∂R
R˜
t
+ γb˜
t−1
+ ψ
t
− π−1
∂m
∂R
R˜
t−1
+
m
π2
π˜
t
−
Rπ−1b˜
t−1
− π−1bR˜
t−1
+Rbπ−2π˜
t
,
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where π, b,R are the non-stochastic steady state values and
∂m
∂R
= Cβ
is the derivative of the money demand function at the non-stochastic steady
state. Note that Rπ−1 = β−1 by (2). The next step is the observation that
R˜
t
= απ˜
t
+ θ
t
as a result of centering. This yields the ﬁnal linearization (32) below.
Collecting everything together we have the two Leeper-type equations
E∗
t
π˜
t+1
= αβπ˜
t
+ βθ
t
and
0 = b˜
t
+ π˜
t
(
Cβα +
m
π2
+Rbπ−2
)
+ π˜
t−1
(
−π−1Cβα− π−1bα
)
(32)
+b˜
t−1
(γ − β−1) + Cβθ
t
+ ψ
t
+ θ
t−1
(
−π−1Cβ −
b
π
)
.
Equation (32) implicitly speciﬁes the coeﬃcients ϕ
1
, ϕ
2
, ϕ
3
, ϕ
4
of equation
(16). Here α, β, γ are just the original model parameters,
C =
(
−Cˆβ
σ
2
)
(π − β)−(1+σ2)/σ2 +
(
σ
2
− 1
σ
2
)
Cˆ(π − β)−1/σ2πσ2−2,
in which again σ
2
is a parameter in the original model, and Cˆ = (Aβ)1/σ2(y−
g)σ1/σ2, where π,m, b, R are the non-stochastic steady state values. The latter
are given by equations
βR = π
b+m+ γ
0
+ γb = g +mπ−1 +Rπ−1b
R = α
0
+ απ
and
m = A1/σ2(y − g)σ1/σ2βR(R− 1)−1/σ2.
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A.3 Regularity Conditions
For either speciﬁcation the system under RE can be rewritten as(
1 0
−ϕ
2
β−1 − γ
)(
π
t
b
t
)
=
(
(αβ)−1 0
ϕ
1
1
)(
π
t+1
b
t+1
)
+
(
(αβ)−1
0
)
η
t+1
+(
0
ϕ
3
)
θ
t+1
+
(
−α−1
ϕ
4
)
θ
t
+
(
0
1
)
ψ
t+1
,
or (
π
t
b
t
)
= J
(
π
t+1
b
t+1
)
+ F
1
η
t+1
+ F
2
θ
t+1
+ F
3
θ
t
+ F
4
ψ
t+1
,
where
J =
(
(αβ)−1 0
(β−1 − γ)−1(ϕ
1
+ ϕ
2
(αβ)−1) (β−1 − γ)−1
)
and where η
t+1
= π
t+1
−E
t
π
t+1
.
The eigenvalues of J are (αβ)−1 and (β−1 − γ)−1. If either root is less
than one, imposing non-explosiveness gives a linear restriction between π
t
, b
t
and θ
t
. This is obtained as follows.17 Diagonalize J as J = QΛQ−1, where
Λ = diag((β−1 − γ)−1, (αβ)−1). Let (x
t
, z
t
)′ = Q−1(π
t
, b
t
). If |(αβ)−1| < 1
then non-explosiveness of the solution requires that x
t
+ C
1
θ
t
= 0 where C
1
depends on Q−1 and F
3
. It can be shown that x
t
= π
t
yielding the static
linear relationship satisﬁed by the monetarist solution. If
∣∣(β−1 − γ)−1∣∣ < 1,
then non-explosiveness requires that z
t
+ C
2
θ
t
= 0. Rewriting z
t
as a linear
function of π
t
and b
t
gives the static linear relationship satisﬁed by the ﬁscalist
solution.
Finally, we remark that in Section 4.1 the ﬁscalist solution II can be
shown to satisfy the ﬁscalist static relationship whether or not the model is
regular. Since the matrix B is singular, one row is proportional to the other
row and it can be veriﬁed that the proportionality factor is αβϕ1+ϕ2
β
−1
−γ−αβ
, which
is the same as the coeﬃcient in (18).
17
For the technique see the Appendix of Chapter 10 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
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A.4 Serially Correlated Shocks
Suppose that the shocks v
t
= (θ
t
, ψ
t
)′ follow a V AR(1) process, i.e.
v
t
= Fv
t−1
+ e
t
,
where e
t
is white noise and the eigenvalues of F are inside the unit circle. In
this case the mapping from the PLM to the ALM is unchanged for the A, B
and D components. For C the mapping becomes
C −→MBC +MCF +MD + P
and the E-stability condition for C is
DT
C
= I ⊗MB¯ + F ′ ⊗ C¯.
As an illustration restrict attention to the monetarist solution in the case
α > 0 and F = (f
ij
) is diagonal. It can be veriﬁed that for f
11
, f
22
≥ 0 the
E-stability conditions remain unchanged. On the other hand, when f
11
and
f
22
have diﬀerent signs, the conditions can be tighter. For example, setting
β = 0.95, α = 1.2, f
11
= 0.99 and f
22
= −0.8 yields an unstable root for
DT
C
.
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